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Horne: Tax Law

TAx LAW
COUNTIES AND MUNICIPALITIES GIVEN BROAD POWER TO RAISE REVENUE

In Hospitality Association of South Carolina, Inc. v. County of Charleston,' the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the validity of county and
municipal ordinances that imposed percentage charges on accommodations and
on food and beverages sold by establishments holding licenses for on-premises
consumption of beer, wine, or other alcoholic beverages. Plaintiffs, a trade
association, a private citizen, and the businesses that would be required to
collect and pay the additional charges, challenged the ordinances as conflicting
with both constitutional and general statutory law. 2 The South Carolina
Supreme Court, by a 3-2 vote,3 held that (1) the local governments had the
power to enact the challenged ordinances under Article VIII of the South
Carolina Constitution and the Home Rule Act and (2) the ordinances were not
inconsistent with either the constitution or general law of South Carolina.4
A. The ChallengedOrdinances
The Charleston County ordinance' imposes a two percent charge on the
gross proceeds on accommodations6 furnished to transients in Charleston
County. The provider is charged with collecting the fees from lodgers and
paying them into a segregated, interest-bearing account. The ordinance further
provides that collected funds are to be used for capital projects and the support
of tourism.
The Town of Hilton Head's ordinance imposes a two percent charge on
the gross proceeds from the rental of short-term accommodations furnished
within the town to transients.' Again, the provider of the accommodations

1. __ S.C. _,
464 S.E.2d 113 (1995).
2. Id. at _, 464 S.E.2d at 116.
3. Chief Justice Chandler (retired) wrote for the majority. He was joined by Justice Waller
and Acting Associate Justice Pleicones. Justices Finney and Moore wrote separate dissenting
opinions.
4. Hospitality, - S.C. at _, 464 S.E.2d at 120.
5. Charleston County, S.C., Ordinance 910 (Nov. 16, 1993).
6. The term "accommodations" is defined as all "room[s], campground spaces, recreational
vehicle spaces, lodgings, or sleeping accommodations furnished to transients by any hotel, inn,
condominium, motel, bed and breakfast, residence, or any other place in which rooms, lodgings,
or sleeping accommodations are furnished for consideration." Accommodations supplied to the
same person for a period of thirty continuous days are specifically exempt. Id.
7. HILTON HEAD ISLAND, S.C., MUNICIPAL CODE § 4-9-30 (1983).
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collects the fees and pays the proceeds to the town. The monies collected are
paid into a segregated account and are to be used for the primary purpose of
beach renourishment. s
The City of Charleston imposes a one percent charge on the gross
proceeds from the sale of food and beverages sold in establishments that
maintain a license for on-premises consumption of alcohol, beer, or wine."
The fee is charged to the patron, and the establishment pays the collected
monies into a segregated fund. Proceeds are to be used to offset costs
associated with providing additional police, fire, and sanitation services to
tourists.'o
To support the first part of its decision that local governments have the
power to enact the challenged ordinances, the Hospitality court engaged in a
brief recitation of the history of local government in South Carolina." This
analysis, which included only recent constitutional history, failed to explain the
evolution of powers granted to local governments, and as a result, the
interpretation of the concept of "home rule" suffered. To fully understand the
limited powers of local governments and the concept of home rule, a more
thorough historical analysis is necessary.
B. ConstitutionalHistory
The supreme legislative power of the state rests with the General
Assembly. In this context the South Carolina Constitution serves not as a grant
of authority to the legislature, but as a limitation on its plenary powers to
2
enact laws that are not otherwise prohibited by the federal constitution.'
Although the county, as a unit of government, is older than either the state or
the town,'" municipal corporations "are the mere creatures of the legislative
will; and, inasmuch as all their powers are derived from that source, it follows
that those powers may be enlarged, modified, or diminished at any time,
without their consent, or even without their notice." 4
Prior to the constitution of 1868, the government of South Carolina was
centralized. Counties and judicial districts were administered by the legislature.'" In contravention of this centralized scheme, the constitution of 1868
provided that judicial districts would be newly designated as counties and that

8. Id. §§ 4-9-60 to -70.
9. CHARLESTON, S.C., CODE § 2-270 (Supp. 1993).
10. Id.
11. Hospitality, - S.C. at _, 464 S.E.2d at 117-18.
12. Moseley v. Welch, 209 S.C. 19, 27, 39 S.E.2d 133, 137 (1946).
13. 20 C.J.S. Counties § 2 (1990).
14. Lillard v. Melton, 103 S.C. 10, 27, 87 S.E. 421, 428 (1915) (quoting Commissioners of
Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County, 92 U.S. 307, 312 (1875)).
15. Gaud v. Walker, 214 S.C. 451, 463, 53 S.E.2d 316, 321 (1949).
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each county would count as one election district.' 6 The constitution of 1868
also provided for the popular election of a board of county commissioners for
each district17 and provided that "'the corporate authorities . . may be
vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes.'"'s By
later decision this provision of the constitution of 1868 was ruled not to
"embrace the power to levy taxes, except as such power is delegated by some
act of the legislature." 19
The constitution of 1895 looked much like its predecessor. An important
difference was that county boards of commissioners would now be composed
of two members appointed by the governor and one popularly elected county
supervisor." The effect of this was to restore plenary power over counties
to the legislature, a change most likely prompted by the political conditions of
the Reconstruction era." The boards implemented the General Assembly's
legislative directives for each county.
The General Assembly administered the counties' operations through
County Appropriations Acts,' which were specially enacted laws that levied
taxes on property within a county to support county officers, health departments, public buildings, and public education.' The county delegation to the
General Assembly made all county government decisions; thus, for even minor
deviations from the county supply bills (e.g., an increase in pay for county
employees), the citizens of a given county had to lobby their local senator or
representative for the change. In sum, the counties were authorized to act only
when changes were approved by both houses of the legislature and ratified by
the governor. This system became cumbersome in the larger counties, and in
an effort to reduce administrative burden, the legislature created local
governing boards by statutory enactment. 24

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IV, § 19, repealedbyAct of Dec. 20, 1890, 1890
S.C. Acts 649) (emphasis added).
19. Duke v. County of Williamsburg, 21 S.C. 414, 416 (1880).
20. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 3821 (1942) (providing for the composition of the county
board of commissioners).
21. Gaud, 214 S.C. at 464, 53 S.E.2d at 321.
22. These bills were also commonly referred to as "county supply bills." BRUCE LrrrLEJOHN,
LIrLEJOHN'S POLITICAL MEMOIRS (1934-1988), at 94 (1989). Supply bills were very specific.
For instance, the Cherokee County supply bill for 1948 designated funding for county officers'
salaries, police uniforms, janitors' supplies in county buildings, boys' and girls' Four H clubs,
and repairs to the old courthouse. See infra note 23.
23. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 7, 1948, 1948 S.C. Acts 2480 (setting forth the method and the rate
at which taxes were levied in Cherokee County in 1948).
24. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 9, 1948, 1948 S.C. Acts 1873 (providing for a popular election to
select between two alternative forms of county government with specific governing powers in
Charleston County). This act withstood constitutional challenge in Gaud v. Walker, 214 S.C.
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In April 1966 the General Assembly created a committee to study the
South Carolina Constitution of 1895. The committee elected Lieutenant
Governor John C. West as its chairman in 1967. Acknowledging concerns
about the efficiency of local government, the West committee presented its
final report to the Governor in 1969.26 Based on the West committee's
recommendations, the General Assembly provided for a referendum vote to
amend article VIII of the South Carolina Constitution on the general election
ballot in November 1972. After a favorable referendum vote, the General
Assembly ratified the amendment on March 7, 1973.27
The amendment essentially consolidated Articles VII and VIII of the South
Carolina Constitution of 1895. A dramatic addition to new article VIII,
however, allowed counties to abandon county boards of commissioners and,
for the first time, allowed municipalities" to vote on one of a maximum of
five alternative forms of government. 29 The amendment, rather reservedly,
gave no immediate power to local governments. Enabling legislation giving
counties and municipalities the power to establish one of five, and one of
three, alternative forms of government, respectively, was not enacted until
1975.30
Additionally, new article VIII affected local taxation. Although article VII
of the 1895 constitution did not vest the counties with a power to tax,
article X, 3 dealing exclusively with finance, taxation, and bonded debt,
provided that counties and municipalities "may be vested with power to assess
and collect [uniform] taxes for corporate purposes." 32 Furthermore, the

451, 53 S.E.2d 316 (1949). The court held that (1) because the constitution of 1895 did not
specifically address the selection of county officers, the General Assembly in its plenary power
could provide for county officer elections; (2) under article VII, section 11, and article X,
section 5, of the constitution of 1895, the legislature had the authority to grant Charleston County
the power to make appropriations, levy taxes, incur indebtedness, and issue bonds; and
(3) because section 7233 of the 1942 Code expressly granted the police power to cities and towns
exclusively, that portion of the act conferring police powers upon the county violated the
uniformity requirement of the constitution of 1895.
25. FINAL REPORT OF THE COMM. TO MAKE A STUDY OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA

CONsTrrUTION OF 1895 (1969) [hereinafter "West Committee Report"].
26. Id.
27. Act of Mar. 7, 1973, 1973 S.C. Acts 67.
28. The term "municipalities" historically referred to cities and towns and not townships. See
Askew v. Smith, 126 S.C. 159, 167-68, 119 S.E. 378, 381 (1923).
29. S.C. CONsT. art. VIII, §§ 7, 9.
30. Home Rule Act, 1975 S.C. Acts 692. "Home rule" is discussed more fully below.
31. Article X was amended after the adoption of new article VIII. Act of May 4, 1977, 1977
S.C. Acts 90.
32. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. X, § 5 (emphasis added). Corporate purposes have included
the construction of a public auditorium, Cothran v. Mallory, 211 S.C. 387, 45 S.E.2d 599
(1947), a public hospital, McLure v. McElroy, 211 S.C. 106, 44 S.E.2d 101 (1947), public
school buildings, Jordan v. City of Greenville, 79 S.C. 436, 60 S.E. 973 (1908), but not county
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previous article VIII provided that "[tlhe General Assembly shall restrict the
for public purposes."3 Despite
powers of cities and towns to levy taxes
this seemingly more liberal grant of power to cities and towns under
article VIII of the constitution of 1895, the South Carolina Supreme Court read
the above provision in accordance with article X to hold that municipalities did
not have an inherent power to tax.34
With regard to local taxation, new article VIII, worded more restrictively
than old article VIII, specifically provides that "[t]he General Assembly shall
provide by general law for the

. . .

power to tax different areas at different

rates." 35

Article X, section 6, of the current South Carolina Constitution
provides that "[tihe General Assembly may vest the power of assessing and
collecting taxes in all of the political subdivisions of the State." In the area of
local taxation very little has changed from the constitution of 1895 to the
present constitution; thus, precedent interpreting similar taxation provisions
from the earlier constitution remains useful.
C. Home Rule
In addition to the concerns about the efficiency of the county boards of
commissioners addressed by the West committee, a series of reapportionment
decisions issued by the United States Supreme Court rendered such boards
even more problematic. In response to those decisions, South Carolina
abandoned the one county-one senator system36 for a system providing equal
representation according to population.3 7 As a result of reapportionment, a
senator often represented more than one county. These changes in representation, as well as the growing difficulty of conducting all the business of a
county in the capital city, prompted discussion among local governments and
in the statehouse of what is commonly referred to as "home rule."
The Hospitality majority emphasized this concept of "home rule."
Although the court recognized that "Article VIII directed the General
Assembly to implement what was popularly referred to as 'home rule' by
establishing the structure, organization, powers, duties, functions, and

sewer construction, Doran v. Robertson, 203 S.C. 434,27 S.E.2d 714 (1943) (a public purpose).
33. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. VIII, § 3.
34. See Carroll v. Town of York, 109 S.C. 1, 95 S.E. 121 (1918) (holding that when the
Town of York enacted a license tax for the transfer of cotton in contravention of a state statute
that expressly prohibited the collection of such a tax, the court, in interpreting article X, section 5
of the 1895 constitution, held that the town could not impose a tax without legislative direction
and struck down the town's license tax as unconstitutional).
35. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
36. Until 1967 each of the forty-six counties in South Carolina had one senator and at least
one house member. Duncan v. County of York, 267 S.C. 327, 334, 228 S.E.2d 92, 95 (1976).
37. O'Shields v. McNair, 254 F. Supp. 708 (D.S.C. 1966).
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responsibilities of local governments by general law,"38 the court, in its
failure to find specific statutory authority, implied that the term "home rule"
carries with it complete local sovereignty independent of express statutory
authorization. The court demonstrated in Hospitality and in one other case,
Williams v. Town of Hilton Head Island,39 that the use of the term is
treacherous because it means different things in different jurisdictions.
First, it is important to distinguish between constitutional home rule,
otherwise known as self-executing charters, and legislative home rule, which
is present in South Carolina. In constitutional home rule states, the constitutions are basic sources of local government power and act as limitations upon
legislative control.' Conversely, in legislative home rule states, local
governments derive their powers from the legislature acting within constitutional parameters.
Some constitutional home rule states expressly provide for the power to
tax in their state constitutions. For example, the Ohio Constitution grants
municipalities a breadth of powers4' which Ohio courts have held includes the
authority to impose income taxes.42 Clearly, in the absence of a uniform or
graduated income tax, the Ohio legislature did not pre-empt the field.43
Illinois' constitution, another example of a self-executing charter, grants
home rule units a broad power to tax" and expressly restricts the legislature

38. Hospitality, _ S.C. at_, 464 S.E.2d at 117. It is noteworthy that the term home rule
does not appear in any part of the South Carolina Constitution.
39. 311 S.C. 417, 429 S.E.2d 802 (1993).
40. 1 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 3.01 (1989). For
example, Alaska's constitution provides: "A home rule borough or city may exercise all
legislative powers not prohibited by law or by charter." ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 11. "'The
test we derive from Alaska's constitutional provisions is one of prohibition .... A municipal

ordinance is not necessarily invalid in Alaska because it is inconsistent or in conflict with a state
statute. The question rests on whether the exercise of authority has been prohibited to
municipalities.'" Simpson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 635 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Alaska Ct. App.
1981) (quoting Jefferson v. State, 527 P.2d 37, 43 (Alaska 1974)). The South Carolina Supreme
Court in Williams not only failed to recognize a distinction between constitutional and legislative
home rule, it relied upon case law interpreting a brand of home rule that does not exist in South
Carolina. Williams, 311 S.C. at 422, 429 S.E.2d at 805.
41. OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 ("Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers
of local self-government . . . ."); OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 13 ("Laws may be passed to limit
the power of municipalities to levy taxes and incur debts for local purposes .

. . .").

It is

noteworthy that this language is similar to language in article VIII, section 3 of the constitution
of 1895. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
42. See Angell v. City of Toledo, 91 N.E.2d 250 (Ohio 1950); Village of Ottawa Hills v.
Joelson, 341 N.E.2d 611 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
43. Subsequent to Angell and Joelson, the Ohio legislature enacted OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5747.02 (Anderson 1996), establishing rates for state income taxes and explicitly providing that
the levy of state income tax does not prevent municipalities from imposing income taxes.
44. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
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from providing for the exclusive exercise of the taxing power.45 Other
constitutional home rule states, although not expressly granting the power to
tax in their constitutions, nevertheless grant broad constitutional powers to
municipalities and then, by statute, expressly limit the exercise of those
powers.4 6

South Carolina is a legislative home rule state. Unlike constitutional home
rule states in which local governments derive their powers from a broad
constitutional grant, here local governments derive their powers from the
legislature. Article VIII, section 7, of the South Carolina Constitution reads
as follows: "The General Assembly shall provide by general law for the
structure, organization, powers, duties, functions, and the responsibilities of
counties .

. . ."

Similarly, Article VIII, section 9, provides that "[t]he

structure and organization, powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities of
the municipalities shall be established by general law."
The Hospitality majority cited the local government section of the West
Committee Report in concluding that "amendments to the Constitution...
place[d] the control and management of county and municipal affairs in the
hands of duly elected local officials."' The West committee itself, however,
had correctly recognized, the new constitution alone and in the absence of
enabling legislation granted the local governments no new power 4 -the
essence of legislative home rule. Notwithstanding the West committee's vague
definition of "home rule,"4 9 it recognized both implicitly in its report10 and
explicitly during one of its meetings 5' that local governments in South

45. ILL. CONST. art VII, § 6(h); see also Chicago Park Dist. v. City of Chicago, 488 N.E.2d
968 (Il. 1986) (holding that the state had not prohibited a city's mooring tax simply by regulating
harbors).
46. Compare S.D. CONST. art. IX, § 2, with S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 6-12-6 (Michie 1993).
South Dakota's constitution grants counties and cities broad powers of self-government but
expressly restricts the power of home rule units through legislation.
47. Hospitality, _

S.C. at

_,

464 S.E.2d at 117.

48. "This section [article VII which later became article VIII] permits all local governments
The authority
to continue under existing laws until changed by the General Assembly ....
granted in this section is broad enough for the General Assembly to disallow municipal charter
powers, but such action is very unlikely." West Committee Report, supra note 25, at 85.
49. The West Committee Report stated:
The term "home rule" as used here is a legal term applied in municipal and
county government in this country. Legally, the term means a system of government
developed by local people and approved by the local voters rather than a system
prescribed by state law. The term should not be confused with the current colloquial
use referring to the practice whereby county government is controlled under a local
board rather than by the legislative delegation.
Id. at 89.
50. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
51. In response to a question from Mr. Ouzts, a representative from the Municipal
Association, as to whether income and sales taxes were exclusively for the use of state
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Carolina derive their powers not from the constitution, but from express
statutory authority enacted pursuant to the constitution.
D. Service Charge or Tax?
The majority in Hospitality did not conclusively designate the charges as
either fees or taxes." The distinction is a critical one because according to
the statutes granting specific powers to counties 3 and municipalities,5 4 local
governments are authorized to levy only two kinds of taxes: (1) ad valorem
property taxes and (2) business license taxes.5 5 These statutes contain no
grant, either express or implied, of a power to impose a sales tax. The only
statutory authority allowing imposition by local governments of a sales tax is
contained in the local option sales tax law. 6
Counties and municipalities are authorized by statute to enact uniform
service charges.5 7 The charges imposed by the Hospitality ordinances,
however, are not characteristic of a service charge. In Brown v. County of
Horry5 8 the South Carolina Supreme Court defined a service charge as a
charge "imposed upon those for whom the service is primarily provided. " "
At issue in Brown was a vehicle registration fee assessed on all motor vehicles
registered in Horry County. The revenues collected were for the purpose of
maintaining county roads. In upholding the validity of these fees, the court
examined three factors that distinguish a fee or uniform service charge from
a tax: (1) whether the charge is "an enforced contribution to provide for the

government, Mr. West responded: "Yes .... I don't believe that the municipalities under the
existing law have a right to levy an income or a sales tax." Mr. Ouzts then asked, "You have
also excluded it again, haven't you?" Mr. West replied, "Right .... In other words, there is
nothing in this provision to say that the State shall not provide that municipalities with home rule
can add a 1%sales tax, but you couldn't do it without express State permission since the sales
tax is presently preserved for collection by the State." Minutes of the Committee to Make a Study
of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895, Jan. 19, 1968, 41-42 (S.C. 1968).
52. The word "fees" appears throughout the majority's opinion a number of times, and all
three ordinances refer to the charges as fees. Adesignation alone, however, is not determinative.
Brown v. County of Horry, 308 S.C. 180, 184, 417 S.E.2d 565, 567 (1992).
53. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-30 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1995).
54. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
55. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-30 (5)(a), (12) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 5-7-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
56. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4-10-10 to -100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995). The local option
sales tax provisions allow local governments to levy a one percent sales and use tax, provided
that certain requirements are met, including approval of the tax in a county-wide referendum and
adherence to strict formulas for distributing and spending the taxes collected.
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995) (counties); S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-730 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995) (municipalities).
58. 308 S.C. 180, 417 S.E.2d 565 (1992).
59. Id. at 184, 417 S.E.2d at 567.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss1/15
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support of government" or "a charge for a particular service"; (2) whether
"the portion of the community which is required to pay it receives some
benefit as a result of the improvement made with the proceeds of the charge";
and (3) "the objective in imposing the fee. "I
It is generally recognized that a fee differs from a tax in that it is
voluntary. That is, the person paying the fee may elect whether to accept the
benefit or service being offered. 6' The charges imposed by all three ordinances in Hospitality are not voluntary in the sense that the person paying may not
choose whether to accept the benefit purportedly offered by the local
governments. All persons staying in short-term accommodations on Hilton
Head Island must pay the beach preservation fee regardless of whether they
use the beach. Likewise, the county and city ordinances are such that persons
subject to the fees cannot avoid paying them by electing not to accept the
improvements or services provided. Persons staying in Charleston County
accommodations must pay the fee regardless of whether they choose to utilize
the "tourism-related" projects to be supported by the fee. The fee is exacted
not in exchange for particular services rendered, but as an enforced contribution toward the cost of traditional governmental functions-the hallmark of a
tax.62

Although a charge is not a tax merely because the general public may
obtain some benefit, a charge does not constitute a service charge unless the
person paying it receives a special benefit not shared by the rest of the
community. As noted above, a service charge is "imposed upon those for
whom the service is primarily provided." 63 Unlike the Brown court,' the
Special Master' in Hospitality found that for all three charges the persons
60. Id. at 184-85, 417 S.E.2d at 568.
61. Executive Aircraft Consulting, Inc. v. City of Newton, 845 P.2d 57, 62 (Kan. 1993); see
also National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974) ("A fee,
however, is incident to a voluntary act. . ... "); Emerson College v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d
1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984) ("[They are paid by choice, in that the party paying the fee has the
option of not utilizing the governmental service and thereby avoiding the charge . . . ."); Powell
v. Chapman, 260 S.C. 516, 520, 197 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1973) ("The essential characteristics of
a tax are that it is not a voluntary payment or donation, but an enforced contribution . . .
62. See City of North Little Rock v. Graham, 647 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Ark. 1983).
63. Brown, 308 S.C. at 184, 417 S.E.2d at 567 (emphasis added); see also Emerson College,
462 N.E.2d at 1105 ("[They are charged in exchange for a particular governmental service
which benefits the party paying the fee in a manner 'not shared by other members of society ...
'" (quoting National Cable Television Ass'n, 415 U.S. at 341)).
64. The court in Brown did not address the fact that people living outside of the county who
were not subject to the road maintenance fee had equal access to the public roads in Horry
County. Butsee Fairway Ford, Inc. v. County of Greenville, No. 24496, 1996 WL 543846 (S.C.
Sept. 23, 1996) (holding a $200 per plate fee on all automobile dealer and wholesaler license tags
designated for road maintenance was an illegal service charge when asserted special benefit of
greater profits as a result of fewer paint repairs from flying road debris found to be a benefit
shared by all car owners and not just those owners with dealer tags).
65. The plaintiffs commenced the action by filing a petition for original jurisdiction pursuant
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paying the fees received no special or designated benefits different from others
in the community and that the services or improvements provided would be
equally available to persons who are not subject to the fees. 66
The final factor to be analyzed in determining whether a fee constitutes
a uniform service charge is the objective for which it is imposed. In Brown the
court held that the fact that road maintenance fees were to go into the county's
general fund did not automatically render the collection a tax.67 Therefore,
the fact that the fees involved in Hospitality were earmarked for certain
purposes does not, in and of itself, make them service charges. As the South
Carolina Supreme Court has stated: "'In determining the nature of the tax or
fee, the distribution of the fund obtained... is one element which may be
considered along with others, but it is not the determinative factor.'" 68 The
critical question is whether the charges are imposed to raise revenue for the
local government or to compensate the local government for expenses incurred
in providing a particular service. Here, because of the lack of a nexus between
the money collected and the provision of governmental services, it appears that
the objective of the ordinances is merely to raise revenue for the county and
municipal governments. Under such circumstances the fees are taxes, not
service charges.6 9 Moreover, the ordinances' denominating their charges as

to S.C. App. Ct. R. 229(c). The defendants filed returns consenting to and joining in the petition
for original jurisdiction. On January 19, 1994, the court granted the petition and appointed
retired Circuit Judge Walter J. Bristow, Jr., as Special Master with authority to conduct an
evidentiary hearing and to issue a report containing factual findings and any stipulations of the
parties. An evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Bristow on March 7, 1994, and he issued
his report setting forth his findings of fact and the parties' stipulations on March 25, 1994.
66. Special Master's Report, Mar. 25, 1994, at 10, 16, 23 [hereinafter Report]. To these
findings, the local governments took no exceptions.
67. Brown, 308 S.C. at 185, 417 S.E.2d at 568 (noting that the money collected was
"specifically allocated" for road maintenance).
68. State v. Life Ins. Co. of Ga., 254 S.C. 286, 292, 175 S.E.2d 203, 206 (1970) (quoting
53 C.J.S. Licenses § 3 (1955)); see also Bray v. Department of State, 341 N.W.2d 92, 97 n.4
(Mich. 1983) ("Earmarking the proceeds of a tax for a specific fund or special purpose, as is
frequently the case in Michigan's scheme of taxation, rather than the general fund does not make
the exaction any less a tax."). Revenues received under the local option sales tax and the state
accommodations tax must be allocated by the local governments to special funds. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 4-10-90(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-4-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1995).
69. See Executive Aircraft Consulting, Inc. v. City of Newton, 845 P.2d 57, 62 (Kan. 1993)
(finding a fuel flowage fee intended to replace revenues lost by municipal airport to competing
fuel distributors was a tax); Audubon Ins. Co. v. Bernard, 434 So. 2d 1072 (La. 1983) (holding
an assessment to strengthen firefighters' retirement system lacked the essential link to
improvement in the quality of fire protection for the public); Radio Common Carriers of N.Y.,
Inc. v. State, 601 N.Y.S.2d 513 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (concluding that a fee on paging devices
passed to compensate for budgetary shortfall was a tax); Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish
County, 650 P.2d 193 (Wash. 1982) (en banc) (pointing out that "development fees" imposed
on new residential subdivisions were intended to raise money rather than to regulate residential
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"fees," does not alter the analysis when they are, in reality, taxes. "[I]f
revenue is the primary purpose for an assessment and regulation is merely
incidental, or if the imposition clearly and materially exceeds the cost of
regulation or conferring special benefits upon those assessed, the imposition
is a tax."70 The nature of a charge is determined by its characteristics, not
by its designation. 7'
In Reed v. City of New Orleans,72 the Supreme Court of Louisiana
identified four attributes of a sales tax: (1) it "is due and payable at the time
of the sale"; (2) it "is levied on the purchaser and collected by the seller";
(3) it "is calculated as a percentage of the retail sales price"; and (4) the
ordinance creating it "tracks the form and substance of the state general sales
and use tax. " " When examined in light of these four characteristics, the
charges in Hospitality constitute taxes: (1) each of the three ordinances
requires the charge to be paid at the time of sale; (2) all three ordinances
impose a charge upon the purchaser of the goods or services and require
collection by the seller;74 (3) all three ordinances calculate the charge
imposed as a percentage of the sales price-two percent of the gross proceeds
from the accommodations rental under the county and town ordinances and
one percent of the gross proceeds from the sale of the food or beverage under
the city ordinance;75 and (4) the county, town, and city ordinances track
provisions of the state sales and use tax statutes.76

development-such fees constituted constitutionally impermissible taxes).
70. Audubon Ins. Co., 434 So. 2d at 1074; see also Emerson College v. City of Boston, 462
N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984) ("IT]he charges are collected not to raise revenues but to
compensate the governmental entity providing the services for its expenses."); Powell v.
Chapman, 260 S.C. 516, 520, 197 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1973) ("The essential characteristics of a
tax are that it is ... payable in money, and imposed, levied, and collected for the purpose of
raising revenue, to be used for public or governmental purposes.").
71. See Brown, 308 S.C. at 184, 417 S.E.2d at 567; Powell, 260 S.C. at 520, 197 S.E.2d at
289.
72. 593 So. 2d 368 (La. 1992).
73. Id. at 371; see also Cox Cable New Orleans, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 624 So. 2d
890 (La. 1993) (five percent amusement tax determined to be a sales tax); Circle Food Stores,
Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 620 So. 2d 281 (La. 1993) (five percent tobacco tax held to be a
sales tax and not an "ownership" tax); Radiofone, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 616 So. 2d 1243
(La. 1993) (one percent telecommunications sales tax inconsistent with state constitutional
provisions).
74. Report, supra note 66, at 9, 15-16, 22.
75. Id. at 8, 16, 22.
76. For example, a review of the ordinances reveals that many of the collection, remittance,
and reporting requirements are very similar to those under the state sales tax. Cf., e.g., S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 12-36-2540 to -2570, 12-54-90 to -100 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995). Indeed, the
city ordinance requires establishments collecting the fee to file a return with the city at the same
time that they file state sales tax returns. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-2570 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1995). Moreover, the county and town ordinances contain definitions of accommodations
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If the court had found that the charges constituted a tax, it could not have
interpreted article VIII without discussing its relationship to article X. "A
constitution is not to be construed item by item, but must be harmonized. ""7
As Justice Finney pointed out in his dissent, the majority opinion is at odds
with prior decisions construing article X, section 6, that require that the
General Assembly delegate its taxing power by express permission. In Crow
v. McAlpine,78 decided after the adoption of the new article VIII, the court
observed: "The people of this State, in their sovereign capacity have, by the
Constitution, entrusted the taxing power to the General Assembly and except
by express permission of the sovereign authority, this power cannot be
delegated to any subordinate agency." 79 Crow is consistent with earlier
precedent construing similar provisions of the constitutions of 189580 and
1865.81
E. Interpretationof Police Powers
The majority in Hospitality concluded that the failure to effectuate the
"broad grant" of power from sections 5-7-30 and 4-9-25 would "directly
contradict" the statutory admonition that "'the specific mention of particular
powers shall not be construed as limiting in any manner the general powers
of. . .municipalities.'"' Because the general police powers granted by these
statutes do not include a power to tax, the specific taxing powers granted by
sections 5-7-30 and 4-9-25 (i.e., for ad valorem property taxes and business
license taxes) would not in any way be so construed as limiting a broad grant
of police power.83 Furthermore, the majority placed added weight on
language in sections 4-9-25 and 5-7-30 granting to counties and municipalities

identical to the state accommodations statute, and both largely track the language of that statute.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-920(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
77. Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 565, 570, 206 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1974).
78. 277 S.C. 240, 285 S.E.2d 355 (1981).
79. Id. at 243, 285 S.E.2d at 357 (citing Gaud v. Walker, 214 S.C. 451, 53 S.E.2d 316
(1949)); see also Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Aiken, 279 S.C. 269, 272, 306 S.E.2d
220, 222 (1983) (holding that the power to impose a municipal license tax is to be strictly
construed and exercised in strict conformity with the terms of its grant). Article X, section 6,
provides: "The GeneralAssembly may vest the power of assessing and collecting taxes in all of
the political subdivisions of the State." S.C. CONST. art. X, § 6 (emphasis added).
80. Carroll v. Town of York, 109 S.C. 1, 95 S.E. 121 (1918); Lillard v. Melton, 103 S.C.
10, 87 S.E. 421 (1915).
81. Duke v. County of Williamsburg, 21 S.C. 414 (1880).
464 S.E.2d at 118 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-7-10 (Law.
82. Hospitality, _ S.C. at,
Co-op. 1976)); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-25 (Law. Co-op, Supp. 1995).
83. See also Ivy Club Investors Ltd. Partnership v. City of Kennewick, 699 P.2d 782, 784-85
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (broad grant of police powers under WASH. CONsT. art. XI, § 11, did
not include the power to tax).
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the "authority to enact regulations, resolutions, and ordinances
respecting
any subject as appears to them necessary and proper for the security, general
welfare, and convenience of counties [or municipalities] or for preserving
health, peace, order, and good government in them."" This broad grant of
power, however, historically has been interpreted to confer upon local
governments only police power,"s not the power to tax.8 6 For a century, the
General Assembly has utilized virtually identical language in delegating police
power to municipalities.8 7
The majority in Hospitality blurred a distinction the court had previously
recognized between police powers granted to local governments by the broad
language of sections 4-9-25 and 5-7-30, enacted pursuant to article VIII, and
the taxing power, which is controlled by article X of the state constitution. In
8 the court interpreted the same
Williams v. Town of Hilton Head Island,"
police powers language to uphold a one-fourth of one percent real estate
transfer fee on all property sold within the Town of Hilton Head. The issue,
as phrased by the court, was whether article VIII alone conferred the power
on the town to enact the ordinance or whether express statutory authority was
necessary. 9 The Williams court held that the legislature abolished Dillon's

84. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-9-25 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
85. In City of Charleston v. Jenkins, 243 S.C. 205, 208-209, 133 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1963)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted), the court stated:
This grant of [police] power [pursuant to section 47-61] for purposes of
municipal legislation is as broad and comprehensive as it was within the power of the
State to delegate. It is a grant of the sovereign policepower of the State itself limited
alone (1) by the territorial confines of a municipality authorized to exercise it, and
(2) by the proviso that legislation thereunder shall not be inconsistent with the laws
of the State. Any and all ordinances enacted under Section 47-61 of the Code must
be in the exercise of the police power thus granted.
86. In Owens v. Owens, 193 S.C. 260, 265, 8 S.E.2d 339, 341 (1940), the court stated:
We think that it is clearly the law that a regulatory measure of this kind may
produce only such revenue as is reasonably necessary to defray the expense connected
with its operation, and that an ordinance passed for the real purpose of raising
revenue, under the guise of obtaining funds for the enforcement of a police
regulation, is invalid.
87. See Act of Feb. 19, 1901, 1901 S.C. Acts 648, 652; Act of Feb. 19, 1898, 1898 S.C.
Acts 820; Act of Mar. 5, 1896, 1896 S.C. Acts 67, 70-71; see also Lomax v. City of Greenville,
225 S.C. 289, 297, 82 S.E.2d 191, 195 (1954) ("'It is a grant of the sovereign police power of
the state itself.. .. '" (quoting Clegg v. City of Spartanburg, 132 S.C. 182, 185, 128 S.E. 36,
37 (1925))); Southern Fruit Co. v. Porter, 188 S.C. 422, 428, 199 S.E. 537, 539 (1938) ("It is
entirely clear that any and all ordinances enacted under this section must be in the exercise of the
police power thus granted.").
88. 311 S.C. 417, 429 S.E.2d 802 (1993).
89. Williams, 311 S.C. at 420, 429 S.E.2d at 803-04. The issue of whether the real estate
transfer fee constituted a fee or a tax was neither briefed nor argued before the supreme court.
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Rule 9 by the passage of section 5-7-30, which taken with article VIII gives
municipalities the following power:
to enact regulations . . deemed necessary and proper for the security,
general welfare and convenience of the municipality or for preserving
health, peace, order and good government, obviating the requirements for
further specific statutory authorization so long as such regulations are not
inconsistent with the Constitution and general law of the state. 9'
In reaction to Williams, the General Assembly passed legislation requiring
counties and municipalities to remit to the state treasurer all monies collected
as real estate transfer fees. 2
Justice Finney, who authored the Williams opinion, dissented in
Hospitality and stated that he would overrule the decision in Williams to the
extent it was inconsistent with his Hospitality dissent.93 He objected to the
majority's refusal, once again, to engage in a fee/tax analysis and to its
interpretation of the statutory grant of police powers to counties and municipalities as empowering those local governments to also impose taxes. 4 He found
this conclusion, which would effectively "vest unlimited taxing powers in local
government, " 95 contrary to the home rule amendments and article X of the
South Carolina Constitution. In light of Justice Finney's analysis in Hospitality, he would probably now require the Town of Hilton Head to point to
express statutory authority to impose its property transfer tax.

As suggested by the HospitalityAssociation plaintiffs at oral argument, the omission of this basic
and highly relevant issue indicates that the Williams suit was friendly. Interview with William J.
Quirk, Professor of Law, U.S.C. School of Law, in Columbia, S.C. (May 24, 1996).
90. Prior to the enactment of section 5-7-30, the powers of municipal corporations were
interpreted according to Dillon's Rule:
A municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no
others: First, those granted in express words; Second, those necessarily or fairly
implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; Third, those essential to the
accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the declared objects and
purposes of the corporation, not simply convenient, but indispensable.
Id. at 421, 429 S.E.2d at 804.
91. Id. at 422, 429 S.E.2d at 805. The Williams court failed to articulate the significance of
the abolition of Dillon's Rule. The liberal rule of construction in article VIII, section 17, cannot
be read to grant local governments any more powers than expressly given under article VIII and
accompanying legislation. See Sheppard v. City of Orangeburg, 314 S.C. 240, 442 S.E.2d 601
(1994).
92. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1-70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
93. Hospitality, _ S.C. at __ n.4, 464 S.E.2d at 122 n.4 (Finney, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at
, 464 S.E.2d at 120-21.
95. Id. at _,
464 S.E.2d at 121.
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F. Liberal Rule of Construction
The court in Hospitality also emphasized the liberal rule of construction
found in article VIII, holding that striking the ordinances as unconstitutional
would be "inconsistent with the liberal rule of construction mandated by
Article VIII, [section] 17."96 This rule of liberal construction does not,
however, grant powers to local government.' Thus, interpretation of the
statutes in accordance with established precedent construing the powers of
local governments does not violate the rule of liberal construction required by
article VIII, section 17.
G. Ordinances Inconsistent with the General Law
The majority concluded that the only limitation placed upon the broad
grant of power in the applicable statutes is that the "regulation, resolution, or
ordinance be consistent with the Constitution and general law of this State. "9
Once it concluded that the county and the municipalities had the power to
impose the charges pursuant to the broad grant of police power, the majority
also concluded that the ordinances were not pre-empted by or in conflict with
the local option sales tax, state accommodations tax, or beer, wine, and
alcohol tax statutes because there was no attempt to "change or circumvent"
the statutory requirements.' In so concluding, the majority overlooked
statutes governing beer, wine, and alcoholic beverage taxes that specifically
prohibit "all other taxes" including county and municipal taxes. °° This
application of article VIII, section 14, of the South Carolina Constitution and
sections 4-9-25 and 5-7-30 conflicts with recent decisions of the court applying
those provisions.' 0'

96. Id. at

_,

464 S.E.2d at 118.

97. See Sheppard v. City of Orangeburg, 314 S.C. 240, 244, 442 S.E.2d 601, 604 (1994)

(holding liberal construction of§ 5-7-30 may notlead to absurd result; thus, municipalities cannot
operate a cable television system).
98. Hospitality, _ S.C. at _, 464 S.E.2d at 118.
99. Id. at _, 464 S.E.2d at 119.
100. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-21-1080 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.C. CODEANN. § 12-33-20 (Law.

Co-op. 1976).
101. See, e.g., Crenco Food Stores, Inc. v. City of Lancaster, _ S.C. _, 457 S.E.2d 338
(1995) (holding a city license fee on video poker machines that exceeded the amount a
municipality could impose according to state statute to be inconsistent with the general law and
inviolation of the constitution); City of N. Charleston v. Harper, 306 S.C. 153,410 S.E.2d 569
(1991) (finding a city ordinance denying the opportunity to pay a fine in lieu of imprisonment to
those convicted of simple possession of controlled substances to be inconsistent with state statute
that allowed such alternative).
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Additionally, as pointed out by Justice Moore in his dissent in Hospitality,
the ordinances at issue exceed the statutory parameters for the procedure,
amount, scope, and use of the taxes authorized by the local option sales tax
and the accommodations tax statutes. Justice Moore concluded that the
consequence of the majority's holding is to eviscerate the local option sales
tax:
The General Assembly also restricted the amount of proceeds which each
county can receive and required the funds be used to roll back property
taxes. A county would have no incentive to follow the more rigorous and
limiting procedure set forth by the General Assembly if it could simply
impose a service charge of a higher percentage upon a limited number of
commodities raising greater proceeds to be used as it deems fit.'0
Notwithstanding his recognition that the "ordinances levy what is in reality a
tax,""13 Justice Moore further concluded, regardless of whether the charges
were taxes or fees, that the ordinances conflicted with the general law of the
state. He reasoned: "These local governments can not circumvent the statutory
limitations placed upon counties and municipalities for levying and collecting
the [local option sales tax] and the State Accommodations Tax by imposing
almost identical charges upon a narrow category of commodities." 4
H. Equal Protection Challenge
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the ordinances violated the
Equal Protection Clause of both the South Carolina and the United States
Constitutions. In order to reach this result, the court held that the challenged
ordinances bore a "reasonable relation to the legislative purpose to be
effected."" The court, however, did not apply the three standard requirements for meeting an Equal Protection challenge" to the facts before it.

102. Hospitality, _ S.C. at_, 464 S.E.2d at 123 (Moore, J.,dissenting).
103. Id. at _, 464 S.E.2d at 123. Justice Moore wrote the majority opinion in Brown v.
County of Horry, 308 S.C. 180, 417 S.E.2d 565 (1992), concluding that the road maintenance
charge at issue was a uniform service charge.
104. Id. at __,464 S.E.2d 123-24.
105. Id. at
464 S.E.2d at 120.
106. The requirements are: "(1) the classification bears a reasonable relation to the legislative
purpose; (2) the members of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances; and (3) the
classification rests on some reasonable basis." Brown, 308 S.C. at 186, 417 S.E.2d at 568.
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L Conclusion
As pointed out by Justice Finney, the result of the Hospitality decision is
"to effectuate a wholesale transfer of the taxing power from the General
Assembly to local government" and to grant each political subdivision the
authority "to impose virtually any tax which it wishes, from income tax to
sales tax to excise tax." 07 Another consequence of the decision, as observed
by Justice Moore, is to render null and void the statutory requirements for the
procedure, amount, scope, and use of the taxes authorized by the local option
sales tax and the accommodations tax statutes. 08
The Hospitality decision represents a clear break with over one hundred
years of precedent interpreting the powers of local governments-precedent
unaffected by the adoption of home rule in the early 1970s. The controversial
decision has generated both criticism"° and praise." 0 The decision's
consequences have become readily apparent"' with at least two bills having
been introduced in the General Assembly to limit the amount and 12imposition
of the "charges" local governments may impose upon its citizens.
Although the General Assembly failed to pass either bill, the precedential
value of the decision is nonetheless doubtful. The court's recent decision in
Fairway Ford, Inc. v. County of Greenville demonstrates not only the court's
refusal to expand Hospitality, but perhaps, as indicated by Justice Finney's
reliance on his dissent in Hospitality,"' the court's willingness to reconsider
Hospitality. In addition, the South Carolina Supreme Court has undergone

107. Hospitality, _ S.C. at__, 464 S.E.2d at 120 (Finney, J., dissenting). The majority
opinion also could be read to shift to the local level other sovereign powers of the state, such as
raising a militia, establishing terms and conditions for the exercise of the franchise, and regulating
alcoholic beverages. But see Connor v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 314 S.C. 251, 442 S.E.2d
608 (1994).
108. Hospitality, _ S.C. at _, 464 S.E.2d at 123 (Moore, J., dissenting).
109. See William J. Quirk, State Denies Rehearing in Hospitality Association Decision, 9
STATE TAX NOTES 1747 (1995); William J. Quirk, State High Court Grants Unlimited Taxing
Power to Local Governments, 9 STATE TAX NOTES 1465 (1995); Dawn Hinshaw et al., Justices
Draw Firefor Tax Ruling, THE STATE, Nov. 15, 1995, at Al.
110. See Jim Stone, Editorial, CourtRuling Solidifies Home Rule, Emphasizes Need to Study
Proposals, THE STATE, Jan. 18, 1996, at All. Mr. Stone is the chairman of the Darlington
County Council.
111. See Skyscraper Corp. v. County of Newberry, _ S.C. _, 475 S.E.2d 764 (1996)
(upholding county ordinance imposing a solid waste disposal fee and requiring multi-tenant
property owners to pay the fees oftheir tenants); William J. Quirk, State Supreme Court Uphold
Garbage "Fee," 11 STATE TAX NOTES 1289 (1996); CharlestonJoins Cities Seeking Tax Increase
Before Option Closes, THE STATE, Feb. 15, 1996, at B7.
112. H.R. 4492, llst General Assembly, 2d Sess. (S.C. 1996); H.R. 3901, 1l1st General
Assembly, 2d Sess. (S.C. 1996).
113. Fairway Ford, Inc. v. County of Greenville, No. 24496, 1996 WL 543846, at *1(S.C.
Sept. 23, 1996); see supra note 64.
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significant personnel changes since the Hospitality decision. Only one justice
who joined the majority remains on the court; meanwhile, both dissenters
continue their tenure." 4 Thus, if the identical issue once again comes before
the court, the Hospitality decision may be just one vote away from being
overturned.
Jenny Anderson Home

114. Justice Waller is the only remaining member ofthe majority. Chief Justice Chandler, who
wrote the majority opinion, retired, and circuit judge Costa M. Pleicones sat as Acting Associate
Justice.
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